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1.  Introduction  
    Almond and Verba (1963, p.5) regard the civic culture as including “the ways in 
which political elites make decisions, their norms and attitudes, as well as the  
norms and attitudes of the ordinary citizen, his relation to government  and to his 
fellow citizens”. They consider “social trust and cooperativeness  as a component of 
the civic culture” (p. 490). This definition of the civic culture seems to be even 
broader than the notion of political culture (Lijpart, 1989). However, throughout most 
part of the book cited, Almond and Verba define the civic culture as an ideal 
“rationality-activist model” of a democratic society in which individuals are active, 
well informed and positively oriented to the political structures and processes and in 
which “the subject and parochial orientations are congruent with the participant 
                                                          
1 A revised version of the paper that was presented at the 15-th Annual Congress of the European 
Economic Association (Bozen- Bolzano, 30-th August - 2-nd September 2000). I would like to thank 
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political orientations.”  (pp.31-32)2. The civic culture is “a culture of consensus and 
diversity”, a culture that permits change but moderates it” (p. 8).  
   In this paper the term “civic culture ” is understood in a broad sense: as a system of 
individual attitudes towards political, administrative, and economic structures 
prevailing in a society. For examples, attitudes towards liberal values, democracy, 
observance of law, towards government and competition, the rich or immigrants, 
towards superiors and subordinates, towards bureaucracy and police are all elements 
of the civic culture.  
    About ten years ago, more than twenty-five socialist countries including the former 
Soviet republics started their transition paths to the market economy. Despite country 
differences, reformers have implemented very similar strategies as ten statements of 
«Washington consensus» described it. Liberalization, privatization, and deregulation 
were the main measures to conduct.  
   The recipe for the reforms was based on the implicit assumption that the cultural 
particularities of a country (and other initial conditions) are much less significant than 
the general framework of the market mechanism. It was presumed that the mechanism 
would be quickly adopted and the reformed economies would start to grow. Instead, 
the reforms resulted in deep transformational recession3 that could be explained by 
neither shortage of labor or capital4, nor by lack of demand or inflation costs.  It is a 
widely accepted view now that the most important causes of the recession were the 
weakness of the new market institutions and the low quality of governance. The 
invisible hand of the market is suppressed by the grabbing hand of the state. The role 
of government was underestimated: it was the government who had to enforce new 
market-oriented norms of behavior (Stiglitz, 1997). 
    These conclusions need deeper discussions and explanations. First, one should 
explain why the quality of governance was low and why the state turned out to be a 
grabbing hand. Second, one should ask whether stronger enforcement was possible 
and whether it would have resulted in better outcomes. The culture of governance is a 
part of the civic culture prevailing.  Given a civic culture, could we expect quick 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Judith Shapiro for useful comments and invaluable editorial help. All mistakes are my own.  
 
3 After ten years of the reform only three among 26 transition economies –Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia- had reached their pre-reform GDP levels [Economic Survey of Europe , 2002, p. 230].    
4  In Russia surveys registered an excess of labor and  underutilization of  capacities during last ten 
years.  
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improvements in governance?  The recommendation to strengthen law enforcement 
assumes implicitly that a strategy of the reforms is fixed. However it is changing in 
reality under the pressure of circumstances, and it seems to be reasonable to adjust the 
plan of reforms in advance. To put the same question by another way, let us imagine 
an outside adviser who recognizes that the quality of a government in a country is too 
poor to conduct a successful reform. What would be a wise advice – change ministers 
and improve routines, or develop a new strategy for the reform?  
    The cultural aspects of economic development as well as interrelations between the 
civic culture and democracy have been studied in the vast literature devoted to 
modernization of underdeveloped societies (a number of references may be found  in 
Almond and Verba (1989), Casson (1993), Fang (2001)). However, the cultural 
problems of most former socialist countries are quite different. In this case we have 
well educated and highly industrialized societies where moral, social, and economic 
norms of behavior were formed under the strong pressure of communist ideology and 
the totalitarian state. Much research touches upon the influence of some particularities 
of the “socialist cultural legacy” on the economic transition. But there are few 
investigations especially devoted to this problem. Among notable exceptions are  
Kornai, 1985; Linz , 1998; Shleifer, 1997, Hillman (1999), Hillman and Ursprung 
(2000). An article  by Janos Kornai “ Efficiency and principles of socialists ethics” 
and a chapter “Degrees of paternalism” in his “Economics of Shortage” were  written 
long before the beginning of the large-scale reforms, but nevertheless contain 
important observations directly related to the transition process (Kornai, 1985 a,b). 
They are the starting points of our paper. 
    In this paper we try to describe the main feature of Russian civic culture that could 
influence the outcome of the reform, initiated in 1992, and discuss channels through 
which the influence was realized. We begin with consideration of paternalism and 
what we call “habitual deviationism”, ordinary and routine deviation from official 
rules and laws. Both features were inherited from the Soviet period5. Paternalism and 
habitual deviationism determine a system of people’s attitudes towards the state, the 
                                                          
5 Our goal is an analysis of influence of the civic culture on the reform’s outcome in 
Russia. Therefore we discuss  the cultural norms as they were formed under the 
Soviet power and during the reforms, and do not consider deeper cultural roots 
connected to the pre-Soviet period.          
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law, the property, and the liberal values. It will be demonstrated that this system 
entails an adversarial (using a term of Stiglitz) style of governance and the 
opportunism and corruptibility of the ruling elite. It is argued that “shock therapy” 
may be destructive under this cultural environment and strong initial distortions since 
fast liberalization and privatization release a huge volume of rent and strengthen 
incentives for rent seeking activity. It is further argued that a good reform strategy 
should take civic culture into account and not put forward overly ambitious tasks. One 
has to built a sequence of interim institutions which would be more congruent to the 
initial cultural and institutional environment, facilitate the adaptation of the people, 
and stimulate modernization of cultural norms to reach an effective market system 
with time.  
2. Cultural factors in explanations of transition phenomena 
  Cultural factors are explicitly or, more often, implicitly embedded in explanations of 
many transition phenomena. In particularly, this is related to models with multiple 
equilibria that are widely used to study a jump in corruption, tax evasion, or arrears 
soon after the start of the market reforms. The phenomena are explained as stable 
inefficient equilibria, “lock-ins” or  “institutional traps” (see North , 1997; 
Polterovich, 2000 for a discussion and references). To see an example, let us consider 
an extremely simplified model of the formation of a corruption trap (Polterovich, 
1998).  
  The model includes a representative official who compares expected gain and loss 
for two behavior norms: the honest and bribe- taking behavior. The solution depends 
on the relation of the official wage rate to the bribe level (both presumed to be fixed), 
and on the probability and disutility of being caught. The probability of being caught 
is a function of the scale of corruption: the more people are involved in bribe-taking 
activity the less probable for a concrete bribe –taker to be detected and punished. This 
is an example of the “coordination mechanism” that gives rise to multiplicity of 
equilibria.  
   In the context of this model one can suggest the following explanation of the jump 
in the corruption level at the start of market reforms. Due to economic liberalization a 
huge volume of rent, which was expropriated by the state before, becomes available 
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for private agents6. The gain from rent seeking activity increases drastically, and also 
the bribe level. The regular wage rate of officials is rigid. Therefore many of those, 
who previously observed the law, find it preferable to change their behavior. Due to 
coordination effects, the expected loss of bribe- taking diminishes, and the inferior 
equilibrium is consolidated. With time, the transition rent may disappear and the bribe 
level decreases but the corruption norm continues to prevail; this is a hysteresis effect. 
   There are three points where cultural factors are embedded in this explanation. First, 
the disutility of being caught depends not only on the strength of punishment but also 
on  peoples’ attitudes to  bribe-taking behavior. Second, the probability of being 
caught depends not only on the quality of law enforcement bodies but also on the 
readiness of other people to cooperate with these bodies to reveal corruption cases.   
In fact, there is little hope of defeating corruption without this cooperation.  And 
third, the quality of law enforcement bodies depends on the culture of the ruling elite. 
     This example shows clearly that explanations of the reform phenomena are at least 
incomplete if one does not take into account how cultural factors, prevailing in a 
society, interact with formal institutional changes.  
 
3. An Individual and the Socialist State: the dual nature of paternalism  
   Paternalism is a system of relations between a principal and agents under which the 
principal takes care about agents but without allowing them any freedom and 
responsibility. This way of governing produces a special system of attitudes that will 
be also called paternalism.  
   Paternalism is a standard characterization of the interrelations between an individual 
and the socialist state. In addition to the usual state obligations, the socialist state 
guaranteed a job, a dwelling, free of charge health care and education, and a stable 
pension for every citizen on reaching retirement age. It also promised  “a steady 
growth of the public wealth”. In exchange, the state declared the priority of common 
interests over private ones, and required that the state itself would be recognized as 
the sole agent who knew and expressed common interests. Every person had to serve 
the State, act, write, and speak in accordance to the State ideology. This was the other 
                                                          
6 In Russia, the domestic prices of oil, fuel, non-ferrous metals were several times lower than the world 
prices in 1992. An access to the foreign trade was extremely attractive.   
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side of the implicit contract.  The right of total control was based on the obligations to 
provide protection and welfare. 
     The Soviet economic mechanism was designed in such a way that the state could 
fulfill a part of its obligations. A policy of price stability and full employment was 
maintained.  Managers had no incentives to fire workers, and labor hoarding 
prevailed. Bankruptcies were impossible. Every firm, when in trouble, could count on 
the help of the state. This was possible due to large-scale redistribution of GDP 
through the state budget: the state extracted the profit of successful firms to support 
unprofitable ones.7  In fact, a similar policy was implemented with respect to the 
individual: wage differentiation was low which meant that more productive workers 
were donors to less productive ones. The bulk of investment, that is all new building 
of large and medium size enterprises, was carried out by the state. Under conditions 
of all-embracing  shortage, goods produced were almost surely sold. Marketing 
problems were, in fact, unknown. Financial markets did not exist. Goods’ speculation 
was illegal. Since the state was the sole owner of capital and took a major part of the 
risk it also pretended to deserve most of the returns from all sorts of activities. 
Individual incentives for innovations were weak. All civic organizations including 
professional societies and clubs of interests were under strict state control.  
    A typical Soviet individual lived all his/her life in the same town or village, very 
seldom changed his/her job, and voted for one ruling party.  Many kinds of activities 
were forbidden or restricted.  
    This system formed paternalistic expectations that involved a number of behavioral 
consequences. Lack of options, the numerous restrictions gave rise to the passivity of 
law-abiding citizens, and their unwillingness to try to influence a situation.  
   The implicit contract between citizens and the state was formulated and interpreted 
by the state which, if necessary, did not hesitate to break it directly. Main dogmas of 
the communist ideology contradicted the real facts. The state was not able to fulfill 
many of its obligations and promises, suppressed free exchange of information and 
any political and intellectual opposition. The numerous restrictions created broad 
possibilities for rent seeking. The party and state bureaucracy wallowed in corruption.  
                                                          
7 Since the prices were rigid and highly distorted the permanently negative profit did not indicate that  
the enterprise had to be shut down.  
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     Unfulfilled paternalistic expectations resulted in deep disappointment in the state 
and rule of law institutions, and lack of government credibility. 
    Most people were compelled to break the rules and laws in order to survive, they 
were in a confrontation with the state, and therefore felt themselves unprotected. A 
dual attitude towards the state institutions was formed: they were the main sources of 
wealth and troubles. On one hand, expectations of the numerous state services and, on 
the other hand, a permanent conflict with and distrust of the state institutions - this is 
the essence of the dual nature of paternalism as a culture.              
     Paternalistic attitudes involve longing for a charismatic, strong, wise, and 
benevolent leader. The first President of Russia, Boris Eltsin, was such a leader in 
1991-1992 when the transition started. The reform was an attempt to reconsider the 
paternalistic contract and work out a new one: the state weakened control and people 
accepted lower level of social protection.  However, this new contract was inside of 
the system of paternalistic relations: it was the state that carried the reform and 
promised a quick (after two or three years) rise of living standards.  
     The state did not fulfill its promises. The people lost their savings during the 
month following price liberalization when prices jumped as much as to 3.5 times and 
real wage rate dropped drastically. Fast inflation and deep recession began, 
government and inter-enterprise arrears crises broke out, corruption and criminal 
activities flourished. After 7 years the fall in GDP consisted of 40%, and industrial 
production halved. Social expenditure fell even faster than GDP.  The deep political 
crisis of 1993 and the financial catastrophe of 1998 revealed the ineffectiveness of the 
new political and market mechanisms.        
   The population was deeply disappointed.  In July 1991 about 30% of respondents  
“completely shared  Yeltsin’s views and stands”. The number changed to 11% in 
March 1992 already. It was 7% in November 1993, and merely 3% in January 2000 
(Nikitina, 2000). Table 1 below contains information about attitudes of Russian 
population towards economic and political state of affairs in November 1997, when 
inflation was suppressed and economic growth had seemed to begin, and in 
November 1998 after the financial crisis of August 1998.  
   The data demonstrate that the majority were deeply disappointed by the reform. The 
difference between columns reveals that the respondents reacted to the changing 
situation. In November 1998 the situation was definitely worse as a result of the 
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financial crisis, and improved afterwards. Even in 2002,about 40% of respondents 
considered financial positions of their families as bad or very bad.  
 
Table 1.  Attitudes of Russian population towards economic and political      
                 situation (percentage of respondents agreed or rather agreed  








I experience  tension and irritation or fear 
and anguish   
49 56 35 
I am not satisfied with my life, mostly or 
absolutely 
45 65 38 
Financial position of my family is bad or  
very bad  
50 65 37 
Economic situation in Russia is bad or 
very bad 
69 90 50 
It is impossible to endure our disastrous 
situation 
38 51 21 
The political situation in Russia is tense 
or even critical and explosive 
80 91 59 
Economic reforms have to be continued 34 27 40 
How would you grade our President 
Yeltsin (Putin) in 1 to 10 scale?   
3.1 1.8 5.9 
 
Source: Surveys’ Findings (1999, p.61), (2002 p. 65),. 
   
     In a 1997 survey, Haarland  and Nissen (1999, p.15)  found that the proportion of  
respondents dissatisfied  by the course of reforms is equal to 64% for Poland, 78% for 
Czech Republic, 84% for Hungary, and 89% for Russia. In 1999 the figures changed 
up to 78%, 87%, 76%, and 97%. In all this countries, the people wanted to strengthen 
the bureaucratic power. About 60% of the Poland, Czech, and Hungary respondents 
of the 1997 survey were agreed that “Strong governance is more important now than 
democracy”. In Russia it was 76%  ( Haarland  and Nissen 1999, p.17) 
      It is well known that government credibility is an important prerequisite of the 
success of any economic reform ( Bruno, 1993, p. 265). The credibility influences 
expectations that have a tendency to self-fulfillment.  This was particularly true for 
Russia where the people were strongly oriented toward the state. An evidence of this 
was a sharp drop of President’s credibility described above.           
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      Paternalistic expectations entail the lack of credibility of the market reform policy 
and even resistance to it if the government does not make special efforts to 
compensate losses and to support public and social protection services. 
   Below we discuss some other consequences of the paternalism and some other 
elements of the Russian civic culture in greater detail. 
 
4. Passivity                                                                                                                   
     I believe that, by formal level of participation, Soviet people would have ranked 
ahead of developed countries. Almost all Soviet worker were members of trade 
unions, almost 100% of all potential voters participated in elections, huge number of 
people took part in demonstrations and followed political news. However, it was not 
voluntary participation, and not an evidence of their initiative and interest8.  As soon 
as state pressure was eliminated, people lost their orientation, and their interest in 
politics fell sharply.  
 









1994     9 28 34 28 
1999     13 33 29 25 
 
Source: Zorkaya, 1999, p. 15. 
 
      In 1990 the proportion of respondents who reported significant interest in politics 
was 2.5 times larger than in 1994 and the proportion of those who revealed 
insignificant or no interest was almost three times smaller (Zorkaya, 1995, p.20).   
     The figures can be better understood if one compares them with similar West 
German data (see Table 3).  The figures of the last column of Table 2 are comparable 
with data for Germany in 1962. However, for Germany we have three levels of 
                                                          
8 Apathy, lack of willingness to participate are mentioned as a characteristics of the people in 
communist countries in Brown, Archie, and Jack Gray, 1977, Political Culture and Political Change in 
Communist States. N.Y.: Holms and Meier (cited by Almond (1989)).  
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interest instead of two in Table 2.  Probably, some part of those who reveal 
“insignificant interest” would choose “no” in a three level scale. It is plausible that 
participation in contemporary Russia is close to Germany participation soon after the 
World War II. 
     
Table 3.   Political interest in Germany, 1952-77, % 
 
 1952 1959 1962 1969 1973 1977 
Yes 27 29 37 45 49 50 
Not especially 41 36 39 42 34 41 
No 32 35 24 13 17 9 
 
Source: Conradt. 1989, p.239. 
 
Table 4. Can most people be trusted? (Germany, percentage “yes”) 
1948 1959 1967 1973 1976 
 9 19 26 32 39 
 
 Source: Conradt. 1989, p.254 
       
   Social trust is an important precondition for social activity. The proportion of 
respondents who belonged to some voluntary organization grew in Germany  from 
44% in 1959 to 50% in 1967, and 59% in 1975.  
    It is remarkable that the indicators changed almost monotonically.  
   In a Russian survey of 1989, 42% of respondents answered that they had “many 
intimate reliable friends”. In 1999 this answer was chosen by 13% of respondents. In 
1999 74% believed that they could  completely trust merely two  or three persons. 
(Levada, 2000,  P. 26)9. 
   Lack of trust has direct economic consequence: it increases transaction costs and 
decreases investment (Zak and Knack. (2001)). 
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    Passivity entails comparatively low social and spatial mobility. It was found in 
Gromova (1998, p.26) that about 85-88% of respondents did not change their social 
groups during 1991-1993. The figure is equal to 93% for peasants, 92% for managers 
of the state sector, 89% for directors and workers, 87% for intelligentsia. The outflow 
is explained by retirements and by transition to the private sector. The inflow was 
zero for the group of directors, 2% for managers of the state sector, 1.5% for civil 
servants.  
   In accordance to a survey conducted by VCIOM in 1996 ,  only 15%  of   the 
respondents were ready to move from the a city where they lived to get a better job or 
life conditions, whereas the figure was 26% for Czech Republic, 29% for Poland, 
30% for Bulgaria, 58% for USA. Russia ranks last by this indicator among 23 
countries (Gudkov, 1999, p. 41). There is a substantial difference between West and 
East Germany (45%  and 37%, correspondingly). Russia was also one of the last by 
rank in the proportion of people ready to go abroad to get a better job or living 
standards. 
   Another evidence of passivity is the small number of collective actions of protest. In 
spite of growing dissatisfaction, drop of living standards, and large wage arrears,  
the number of people involved in strikes has been insignificant  (357,000  in 1992,  
120,000  in 1993, 664,000 in 1996) Out of 8,278 strikes taking place in 1996, 7,396 
were in education ( Rossiyskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 1996; Sotsial'no-
ekonomicheskoye polozheniye.., 1996). In fact, trade unions did not influence 
Russian economic life.   
 Difficulties in adaptation to the quick changes are another consequence of passivity.  
In 1999, more than one third of respondents answered that they were not able to adapt 
to the present changes, 16% stated that they just lived as they did before the reforms. 
Only 5% said that they were now able to use new possibilities. In 1994, the figures 
looked rather better – 23%, 26%, and 6% correspondingly (Levada, 1999b, p.8).     
     It was expected that economic liberalization would free the entrepreneurial energy, 
the “animal spirit” that is thought to play so important role on the some early stages of 
capitalist development. However, this expectation was not realized. A possible cause 
is the legacy of the Soviet period. Real initiatives were punished in the past, therefore 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 The data suggest an idea that trust (and, maybe participation as well) is an indicator of congruency of 
a culture and a socio-economic system. Then decrease of the trust level is an evidence of 
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law-obedient people were passive, and did not experience self-organization. 
Dissidents had no popular leaders and qualified managers. Deviators like black 
market businessmen and criminals were the most active. The transition process gave 
them even more opportunities. Mass attitude towards official rules, legal norms and 
law enforcement institutions was the basis for their success. 
 
 
     5. Attitude towards official rules, legal norms and law enforcement   
       institutions: habitual deviationism 
     Those who preferred to be active in the USSR could chose between lobbying and 
deviant behavior. Lobbying was particularly developed by the enterprises. Directors 
traded with ministries for the enterprise plans. Their representatives, called 
“tolkachi”, tried to convince officials to increase the enterprise supply by row 
materials (Kornai, 1980).  Numerous restrictions resulted in efficiency losses and 
sometimes were incompatible so that their violation was inevitable. Every manager 
was forced to break rules to defend the interests of her/his collective.  
     A typical result of inefficient price policies was the overall shortage of goods and 
services.  Huge volumes of goods were illegally resold, and black markets flourished,  
the informal exchange of priority services developed when, for example, a hairdresser 
and a meat seller served  each other without standing in line. Another illegal 
equivalent of the priority service was the bribe system: an officer in a city council, a 
doctor in a hospital, a cashier in a theater box-office, took payments from the 
customers for the right to be served out of line. Millions of people were involved in 
these illegal or semi-legal activities as consumers or sellers. In most they undertook 
voluntary, and mutually beneficial contracts, and their behavior was not condemned 
too strong. 
    The state suppressed and prosecuted dissidents who were considered as heroes by a 
circle of Western-oriented intelligentsia. It added to the fuzziness of moral norms.     
     Rule evasion was transformed into a societal norm. This practice formed a special 
system of attitudes towards infringement of many official rules and legal norms, and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“misadaptation” and growing alianation.      
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towards law enforcement institutions. I call this system  “habitual deviationism”10. It 
includes tolerant or even positive attitudes towards petty bribes, towards participation 
in black market operations, violation of registration rules (“propiska”), exam 
cheating, private use or even petty pilfering of the state property. A habitual 
deviationist does not like law enforcement institutions and hates those who cooperate 
with policemen or investigators. Disagreement with official political doctrines may be 
or may be not a part of these attitudes. Habitual deviationism does not always result in  
opportunistic behavior: a deviant may observe behavior norms that are different from 
the official ones.           
   Habitual deviationism creates an appropriate environment for more serious criminal 
activities. A bribe taker may behave as a partner or as an extortioner, and the 
boundary is very fuzzy. A person who breaks a law is highly susceptible to blackmail 
and can be used by criminal groups. 
     Fuzziness of moral norms became much stronger in the transition period. New 
legislation lagged behind the quickly changing practice, rules of the game were 
modified during the game. Many public organizations- hospitals, universities, 
research institutes- created private firms that employed the same personnel and used 
the same facilities. Many regional rules contradicted the federal legislation 
(“propiska” in Moscow, restrictions of regional good outflows, etc.). This made 
lawful citizen even more passive and facilitated the activities of criminal and semi-
criminal groups - the groups most prepared for the new environment.        
   In a survey of 1997, described in Haarland  and Nissen, (1999), respondents were 
asked which factor was the most influential on the income level: personal 
achievements, personal connections, or a skill in evading laws. The results are 
presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Which factor  is the most influential for the personal income, 1997 




Personal connections Skill in evading laws 
Poland            48            39        13 
                                                          
10 The same term is used for the type of behavior and for the system of attitudes that supports the 
behavior. 
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Czech            37            36        27 
Hungary            37            48        15 
Russia            30            34        37 
 
   Sourse: Haarland  and Nissen 1999, p.16 
 
   The last column reveals a strong difference between Russia and other countries. 
   In 1999 a survey was conducted in the framework of the International Social 
Science Programme. Respondents were asked to what degree they agreed with the 
following statement: “In contemporary Russia it is necessary to give and to take 
bribes if one wants to rise somewhat “on top”. 40% of respondents were completely 
agreed and 34% were rather agreed with the statement. (Khakhulina, 1999, p. 29).  
    In December 1999 survey, Russian respondents were asked: “Do you agree that it 
is not obligatory to pay taxes?” 31% were “rather, agreed” and 59% were “rather, did 
not agree”.  However, the figures were, correspondingly, 62% and 32% for main 
Russian taxpayers, businessmen, and 21% and 68% for pensioners who did not pay 
taxes at all.     
      In a survey of March 1999, 56% of respondents declared that “it is extremely 
reprehensible to take something out of an enterprise (i. e., steal), but 31 % found that   
“it is partly reprehensible”. 22% saw “nothing reprehensible” in purchasing goods 
that were taken out of an enterprise, and 31% considered this as “partly 
reprehensible”.(Levada, 2000. PP. 21-23).     
   Fuzziness of laws entails broad possibilities of their interpretation. Since the law is 
incongruent to reality many people are forced to break it. This implies the selectivity 
of law enforcement. The fuzziness and selectivity both create a base for arbitrariness 
of the judicial decisions and, therefore, for political use of the law enforcement 
institutions. Unsurprisingly, the degree of people’s trust in these institutions is very 
low (see Table 6).    
 
          Table 6.  Do you trust the people of the following professions? (The ratio of 

























Source: Gudkov.2000, p.31 
 
     Only politicians and officials have lower credibility than policemen and judges. 
  In a survey of 1998 respondents were asked “To what extent do you trust the judicial 
system and law enforcement bodies?” There were 30% who answered “very little” 
and 27% - “absolutely do not trust”.  As a result of the distrust, only less than 10% of 
victims of criminal cases apply to the police. This explains why the number of 
registered crimes is less in Russia than in some developed countries (1634 per 100 
thousand of inhabitants in comparison to 7700 in Germany in 1997). However, the 
number of prisoners per capita is enormously high (nine times larger than in 
Germany) (Gudkov.2000, pp.35, 37).             
    Arbitrariness of low enforcement bodies and popular apathy are unfortunately 
connected by positive feedback.  In accordance to a survey of 1996, only 13-15% of 
respondents declared their readiness to collective action if their rights were violated.  
(Gudkov, 2000, p.38). This was merely intention, however. In fact, the number of 
protest actions were insignificant (see Levada, 1999, p.10, and Section 4 above). 
      The lack of credibility of law enforcement bodies could explain why people refuse 
to cooperate with the bodies, and do not inform them about crimes observed (leaving 
aside criminal offences such as murders or robberies). However, the situation is even 
worse: the informers are condemned and hated. As plausible reasons one can mention 
historical memory about Stalin’s era of informers, lack of believe that the information 
will be used effectively and fairly, and a collective self- protection: informers are 
enemies of a collective whose members break the law regularly.  
  In our survey of 2000, devoted to people attitudes towards petty corruption, the 
following situation was described: "Citizen A suggested payment to official B to 
accelerate registration of A’s inheritance. Official B agreed.  Official C reported the 
case to the head of  the department.”  The respondents were asked to characterize 
their attitudes towards citizen A and officials B and C using a five-points scale (Table 
7a). 
Only 32% of respondents condemned citizen A, who initiated the bribe. Negative or 
strongly negative attitudes towards the informer were revealed by 59 % of 
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respondents. Slightly more than a half of them (53%) disapproved and a rather large 
group (15%) supported the briber.   
     Similar attitudes towards A and B were revealed in a survey of 2002 (Table 7b). 
The respondents were Russian students. Their attitude  towards informer C is less 
negative than in the previous survey.  However, attitudes of Israel students (Table 7c)  
 
Table 7a.   Attitudes towards bribe-giver A, bribe –taker B, and informer C  
                                                    Russia, 2000 
                (percentage of respondents and average evaluations; N= 74)  
 




  Towards citizen A 
(suggested  payment 
to B) 
 
 Towards official B 
(agreed to take 
payment from A) 
 Towards official C 
(reported the case) 
1.Strongly   negative  0.04                                  0.11  0.27 
2.Negative  0.28  0.4 2  0.32 
3.Neutral  0.45  0.32  0.15 
4. Positive  0.18  0.11  0.18 
5. Strongly positive  0.05  0.04  0.8 
Average evaluations - 0.08 - 0.45 - 0.52 
 
Average evaluation is defined as 2(line 5) + line 4- line 2- 2(line 1). 
 
 
Table 7b.   Attitudes towards bribe-giver A, bribe –taker B, and informer C . 
                                   Russia (students), 2002,  
              (percentage of respondents and average evaluations; N= 84)  
 




  Towards citizen A 
(suggested  payment 
to B) 
 
 Towards official B 
(agreed to take 
payment from A) 
 Towards official C 
(reported the case) 
1.Strongly   negative 0.06 0.30 0.17 
2.Negative 0.11 0.25 0.32 
3.Neutral 0.55 0.26 0.17 
4. Positive 0.26 0.17 0.20 
5. Strongly positive 0.02 0.02 0.14 
Average evaluations 0.07 -0.64 -0.18 
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are quite different from Russian ones: more negative to bribe-giver and bribe-taker 
and positive to informer.  
 
Table 7c.   Attitudes towards bribe-giver A, bribe –taker B, and informer C 
                                   Israel (students), 2002  
                (percentage of respondents and average evaluations; N= 25)  




  Towards citizen A 
(suggested  payment 
to B) 
 
 Towards official B 
(agreed to take 
payment from A) 
 Towards official C 
(reported the case) 
1.Strongly   negative 0.28 0.56 0.12 
2.Negative 0.24 0.28 0.16 
3.Neutral 0.32 0.12 0.24 
4. Positive 0.16 0.04 0.24 
5. Strongly positive _ _ 0.24 
Average evaluations - 0.64 -1.36 0.32 
 
Average evaluation is defined as 2(line 5) + line 4- line 2- 2(line 1). 
 
Habitual deviationism reveals itself in all spheres of the Russian social life. An 
example is students cheating that is quite typical at all levels of education. Here, 
unwillingness to cooperate with authorities reveals itself in a full measure.  
   The following situation was described in a questionnaire (Magnus, Polterovich, 
Danilov, Savvateev, 2001): Student C reports to the departmental office that student 
A, while taking an exam, copied answers from student B’s paper with the consent of 
student B.   Respondents were asked to evaluate their attitudes towards each A, B, and 
C on a 5-point scale: strongly negative (-2),  negative (-1), neutral (0), positive (1), 
strongly positive (2). The sample includes 506 students studied in Russia, 247 –in 
Netherlands, and 112-in USA. Table 8 contains average evaluations.  
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   The results revealed substantial differences in attitudes11.   Russian students are 
much more tolerant to cheater A, support assistant B, and hate informer C; their 
evaluation of C is not far from the minimum (-2). USA students are much more 
tolerant to the informer. In fact, many of them revealed positive attitude to C.   
 
 
 Table 8. Attitudes to cheating (average evaluations  ) 
 
              A 
 (copied answers 
from B’s paper) 
          B           
(gave her/his 
consent to A)             
             C  
(reported the case) 
Russia  -0.21  0.54 - 1.73 
Netherlands  -0.83 -0.05 -1.36 
USA - 1.35 -0.88 -0.25 
 
Source: Magnus, Polterovich, Danilov, Savvateev ( 2001). 
 
It is important to stress that many respondents not only reject well-known norms of 
behavior but support  alternative norms. 
   Habitual deviationism, disinclination to cooperate with law enforcement bodies, 
make it probable that radical liberal reforms can bring an economy to a stable 
inefficient equilibrium where criminal activity, black market, tax evasion, and 
corruption prevail. 
 
                                                              
 6. Workers’ collectivism and “social responsibility” of managers 
   One of the consequences of Soviet paternalism was a special role for work 
collectives. The state partially delegated the distribution of many goods and services 
to the enterprise level. This included apartments, dachas, cars, kindergartens, sport 
facilities, health and holiday services, and even food and cloth. Stimulating schemes 
connected performance indicators of an enterprise and wage rate of its workers. In the 
late eighties many enterprise directors were elected by the members of their 
collectives. This created a spirit of interdependence and solidarity.  Such a feature of 
the cultural legacy substantially influenced privatization processes, stimulated labor 
hoarding, and slowed down enterprise restructuring.  In a survey of 1993, 58% of 
                                                          
11 Disinclination to cooperate with power is not a unique explanation. Attitude towards competition 
might be important as well. The difference in tolerance to cheating may depend also on designs of 
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enterprise managers declared that one of their main purpose was to preserve their 
enterprise collectives. (Dolgopyatova, 1995, p.85). In surveys of The Russian 
Economic Barometer, about 65 % respondents (managers) pointed out “social 
responsibility” as a main cause of labor hoarding. In all samples of 1995-1999, this 
answer was given much more often than any other response (Kapelushnikov, 2001, 
p.217).  Explaining similar findings, Linz argued that they are caused, at least 
partially, by a paternalistic belief that “everybody has a right for a job” (Linz, 1998).         
 
7. Attitude towards foreigners  
    In 1998 VCIOM conducted a number of surveys in framework of the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Some results were published in Dubin (1999). 
About 48% of Russian respondents (from the total number of nearly 1700) thought 
that “ Western culture has had a negative impact on Russia”. Only 20% agreed that 
“in total, immigrants affected our economy positively” ( 63% for Canada, 37% for 
Poland, and only 9% for Hungary, and 8% for Czech Republic. It is quite possible 
that the lack of selective immigration policy influenced the answers.) About 72% of 
the respondents “in total, did not trust Western businessmen”, and 80% of them are 
confident that “for foreigners, it has to be forbidden to buy land in our country”.  By 
this indicator, Russia is the second among 23 countries after Bulgaria (81%). All East 
European countries occupy the upper part of the list; the figures are 71% for Latvia, 
and 59% for Poland, against 33% for USA and 16 % for East Germany (Dubin, 1999, 
pp. 39, 46).  
    The lack of foreign investments in Russia is usually explained by economic and 
political instability, high uncertainty, and low quality of governance. It would be 
interesting to investigate however, to what extent the attitude toward foreigners 
affects the volume of FDI.         
 
  8. Attitude towards market institutions 
   “ The market economy is complicated and fills people with fear of the future”. 
About 60% of Poland and Czech respondents and about 75% of Hungary and Russia 
respondents agreed with this statement in a 1997 survey  (Haarland  and Nissen 1999, 
p.16). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
educational systems. 
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   More surprisingly, the proportion of people, who disapproved reforms, was larger in 
1999 than in 1992 or 1993 (Table 9). In accordance to a survey of 2001, price 
liberalization and transition to market economy in 1991-1992 were negatively 
evaluated by 54% of respondents, and 85% of the respondents disapproved voucher 









Table 9.  Many people say it would be better if everything in this country remained as 
it had been prior 1985. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (Percentage of 
respondents) 
 
 1992 1993 1999 
Agree 45 46 58 
Disagree 39 30 27 
 
Source: Levada, 1999a, p. 20. 
 
9. Attitude towards democratic institutions and liberal values 
   In most transition countries economic and political orientations of a person seem to 
be strictly connected. For most people the democracy and the free market are strongly 
associated, since both are Western-type values and mechanisms and both are 
antagonists of a Soviet- type socio- economic organization. The economic reform is 
the main issue of the political debate, a core of party political programs. Mass 
attitudes toward property, competition, and income inequality are closely related to 
prevailing political culture.      
     It is well known that credibility of government is an important factor of reform 
success. Therefore the attitude toward governments and governance mechanisms that 
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are standard elements of the political culture have strong impact on economic 
performance. 
      Another kind of potential connections between political and economic culture 
could be rooted in the influence of political regime on the economic outcome. 
However, a number of recent investigations did not reveal direct connections between 
political regimes and economic growth (World Development Report, 1997). What 
was found to be important is governance quality (Stiglitz, 1997; Shleifer, 1997; 
Olson, Sarna, Swami, 1998).  
     In a survey of 1998 reported by Dubin (1999), about 31% of respondents agreed 
that “democracy is harmful for Russia”, and about 56% of respondents thought that 
“principles of the Western democracy are incompatible with Russian traditions”. 
(Dubin (1999), p.39). This corresponds to the answers on a question that was asked in 
another survey of the same program in 1996: “Are you honored by democratic 
institutions of your country?”  Among 23 countries, the percentage of the affirmative 
answers was the lowest in Russia (20%). One should note that the bottom part of the 
list was occupied by nine East European countries and Italy (the sixth from the 
bottom). The highest  number out of the ten belongs to Czech Republic - 35%. In 
Ireland, Canada, Netherlands, USA, Norway the figures amount of 85-80% (Gudkov 
(1999), p. 43).   
      Haarland  and Nissen (1999, p.17) asked respondents in 1997 whether they agreed 
with the statement “Democracy unavoidably entails chaos and anarchy”. The 
proportion of “yeas” was 37% for Poland and Czech, 30% for Hungary, and 66% for 
Russia.    
    The results indicated that  Russian democracy was appeared highly unstable, and 
that Russia might move  to a more authoritarian and more paternalistic system of 
governance. 
 
10.  Manipulability  
   A politician has two strategies to attract voters. She can invest in political projects 
that are potentially useful for her voters. Or she can invest in political advertisement 
to create her image. We say that a voter is highly manipulable if she is sensible to 
advertisement and does not like to evaluate political programs and projects. High 
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manipulability creates incentives not for positive discussions but for spending 
resources to win advertisement contest (Hillman, Ursprung (1998)).  
  High manipulability seems to be a cause of the fast and unmotivated changes in the 
Russian public opinion during the election companies of 1996 and 1998. Only 6% of 
population believed Yeltsin in December, 1995. The figure increased to 22% in July, 
1996 (Zorkaya, 1999a). During two months political block “Edinstvo” increased the 
number of its supporters from 4.3% (in October 1999) to 21.1% (in December 1999). 
In both cases political leaders did not present any program or projects. The effects 
were reached merely by intensive advertisement campaigns, by the struggle of 
personal images and slogans.  
    Democratization may give rise to imperfect democracy due to people passivity, 
unwillingness to participate, and mass manipulability. This kind of a democratic 
mechanism does not help to reveal true preferences of the people, to find consensus, 
and to make effective decisions. It rather turns out to be a field of exhausting battles 





11. The culture of governance  
     In a number of recent investigations it is established that the quality of governance 
is an important determinant of economic growth. Olson, Sarna, and Swamy used five 
indicators from the International Country Risk Guide to measure the quality of 
governance: the risk of expropriation, the risk of repudiation of contracts by 
government, corruption in government, quality of bureaucracy, and rule of law, as 
well as an aggregate of this five variables.  They considered a sample of 68 countries 
for the years 1960-1987 and found that all variables and their aggregate were 
significant to explain the variation in the rates of growth of productivity across 
countries. (Olson, Sarna, and Swamy, 2000).  A similar conclusion was reached 
earlier in  Knack and Keefer (1995). Schleifer compared indicators of legal and 
regulatory environment for Moscow and Warsaw and came to the conclusion “that the 
Russian government is less effective in serving the market economy –as well as its 
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people- than the Polish government”  “ but the exact cause of poor government 
performance is difficult to pin  
down”.  Shleifer rejected cultural arguments “such as low trust12 and anti-market 
culture”, and recommended “to accelerate elections on the sub-regional or local 
levels”, to develop fiscal federalism, and to continue institutional reforms. (Shleifer, 
1997).  
    Today, when paternalistic pressure strengthens in Russia and the demand for “the 
strong hand” rises13, one should have less hope that the situation may be substantially 
improved by new elections. A return to the cultural analysis seems to be more fruitful. 
I have no systematic data to compare the Russian and East European civic cultures. 
However, I will try to outline some arguments and hypotheses that make a cultural 
explanation plausible.14 
      First of all, the culture of the governing elite is strongly connected with the mass 
culture. This is confirmed in Levada (1998). Levada used data of 1994-1997 to 
compare attitudes of leaders and specialists with attitudes of a typical respondent in 
the sample. He has found that a representative of the social elite had a little bit larger 
wage, was more educated, had more positive attitude toward reforms. Nevertheless as 
well as an average person, she required stronger state power. More than 90% of the 
elite believed that the state should guarantee a minimal subsistence level and a job to 
everybody. Levada mentioned paternalist expectations as a characteristic feature of 
both- a representative of the elite and a person from the street (pp.17, 18).    
    Two inherited features considered above- paternalism and habitual deviationism  - 
are particularly important for understanding of Russian governance.  
    A paternalistic governor ignores people attitudes for two reasons. He is sure that he 
knows the people needs better than the people themselves, and he does not expect 
serious resistance from the masses since they are passive and are not able to self-
                                                          
12 The rejection was based on the results of a survey. The survey has shown that Russian index of 
participation was much lower than in most developed countries or China but higher than Hungarian or 
Romanian ones. The Russian trust index was in the middle. In the survey, however, “participation” did 
not include political, trade union, or religious activities. Besides, the trust and participation depend on 
possibilities to participate and, therefore, on the reform process itself. In Russia the trust indicators 
decreased during the reforms.           
13 In a speech of 2001 President Putin said:  “As a President, I am responsible for all events that 
happen in Russia.”    
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organization. If any resistance occur, he tries to suppress it rather than to search for a 
compromise. In fact, he is a follower of the communist philosophic doctrine that 
“struggle of opposites is the moving force of development” and accepts a slogan of 
the Stalin regime “ those who not with us are against us”.  A paternalistic governor 
thinks by extremes, and makes no efforts to find more sophisticated interim solutions. 
She does not admit that her opponents could be right at least partially, and uses 
political debates and voting procedures to win a battle. This authoritarian style 
operating in a democracy can be seen as an extreme case of adversarial system of 
governance; the concept was introduced recently in Stiglitz (1998)15.  
   Stiglitz confronts the adversarial and consensus systems of governance. Consensus 
governance relies on an open dialogue and on some shared conception of the national 
interest. Consensus-based system increases ability of government and political agents 
to make stable commitments and eliminates or, at least, softens destructive 
competition.  Reaching consensus in a democratic and open way is a process that 
merits to be valued in its own right. 
    It is not a surprise that that communist parliamentarians and governors, direct 
successors of the Soviet political practice, followed the adversarial strategies. More 
distressing, reformers inherited the same style. 
   Russian reforms were much more radical than reforms in East European countries if 
one take into account initial conditions. The radicalism implied large social costs and 
deep dissatisfaction. During the year following price liberalization Bulgaria 
experienced a consumption price shock of 339%, Poland- 249%, Romania - 223%, 
Czechoslovakia - 54%, Hungary - 32%.  Expected inflation rates were 
correspondingly 234%, 94%, 104%, 30%, and 31%. (Bruno, 1993, p.220).    
   In accordance to the Russian program, the expected inflation rate was 250 – 350%. 
This was reached during the first month. The first year consumption price shock was 
2600%. People’s savings disappeared in a moment.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
14  Shleifer seemed to be agree with two important cultural arguments that influenced the difference in 
performance of Poland and Russia: traditions of democracy and free markets in Poland, and a critical 
role of the Catholic Church and the Solidarity Labor Union.     
15 Stiglitz write: “… the adversarial system is based on debates which is more for public consumption 
than an attempt to forge common ground for a consensus.” The objective of each party “is not to craft a 
proposal that minimizes the inevitable risk associated with new policy, but to win a victory in the 
political process.” (Stiglitz, 1998, p.19). Stiglitz criticized  Clinton administration for its adversarial 
system of governance. We use the term “adversarial governance” in the Russian context to denote 
authoritarian, confrontationist style that is realized through voting or other democratic procedures as 
well as through manipulation of judicial system to reach political goals.     
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   Russian privatization was also one of the most wide-scaled and quick. During a year 
and a half, about 70% of industrial enterprises were privatized. One should take into 
account that, at the start of privatization, worker collectives considered their 
enterprises as their own property (Polterovich, 1995). From their point of view 
privatization was not merely voluntary transmission of the de jure state property to 
other owners but also an attempt to expropriate the de facto collective property and 
pass it to outside investors. The exhausting struggle between the government and 
worker collectives resulted in the government defeat: most of enterprises retained in 
hands of insiders.   
   The reformers relied on the theory of the “minimal state”, tried to minimize social 
expenditures, rejected importance of industrial policy, and did not pay enough 
attention to regulation problems. People turned out to be unprotected against risky 
bank policies and financial pyramids. An important principle of consensus 
governance - a looser has to be compensated - was for the most part ignored.   
    Whether a norm is enforceable depends on the prevailing system of norms and 
attitudes. However an adversarial government tries to enforce a “good” norm by 
introduction of additional restrictions. Typically, this makes the situation even worse 
since more people find it impossible to respect all requirements. Thus, Russian 
government introduced more and more complicated tax system to combat tax evasion. 
This resulted in even more severe tax evasion. I think that an open dialogue could be 
much more useful but its precondition should be the tax discipline of the elite itself.   
     At the governance level, habitual deviationism involves inability to make 
commitments. The Russian government did not fulfill its obligations permanently. 
The most striking examples are wage and pension arrears and delays in financing of 
the public sector. This policy created strong impulses for development of arrears 
crises. A paradox, the policy was directed to suppress inflation but contributed, 
maybe stronger than inflation, to economic uncertainty and the government discredit.  
    The second consequence of rule evasion was a wide-scaled use of public positions 
for private purposes. By the Corruption Perception Index, Russia was ranked as 47th  
among 54 countries in 1996 and took the 76th place in a list of 85 countries in 1998 
(Tanzi (1998)). Recently, a composite index of state capture was constructed for 
twenty transition economies on the base of Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (Hellman at al (2000)). The index is the average proportion of 
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firms reporting that each of the following components of grand corruption is a 
problem: the sale of Parliamentary votes or Presidential decrees, capture of the 
Central Bank, sale of arbitration or criminal court decisions, and non-transparent 
political party financing. Russia takes 17th place after Bulgaria and Georgia, and 
before Moldova, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan.  
      The third consequence of the habit of rule evasion was numerous violations of the 
democratic norms of the political contest and the governance. 
  Aleksander Korzhakov, a chief of the Yeltsin’s guard, was one of the most 
influential figure in 1994-1995.  He tried to give orders to the Prime Minister and, in 
1998, publicly argued that the coming President elections should be abandoned.         
    In contemporary Russia, the judicial system is widely used to reach political goals.  
Almost every prominent entrepreneur or political figure may be a subject of 
investigation due to law fuzziness and habit of rule evasion. In 1996, the chief of  The 
Federal Security Service announced investigations with respect to 500 officials of 
high rank including 50 top rank officials. Two or three such persons were convicted 
(Gudkov, 2000, p.33). Prominent people may be arrested and dismissed without 
plausible explanations though the semblance of the law is observed  (the more recent 
examples are a mass media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky and an “aluminum king” 
Anatoly Bykov). In June 2000, the General Procurator’s Office attacked a number of 
so called “oligarchs” (major bankers and businessmen), and then closed the cases.  
    During nine years of the reforms Russia has been a field of severe battles between 
Parliament and President. Describing his government activity, Egor Gaidar directly 
uses military terminology:  
   “… In May of 1992 the government retreated under onslaughts of superior forces 
and fought rear-guard actions…”  (Gaidar, 1996, p. 203).   
   In 1993 this war resulted in shelling of the parliament by the government tanks. 
After a short time reformist Gaidar’s party lost parliament elections.         
   Thus, the culture of the Russian governing elite is strongly connected with mass 
culture and is characterized by two inherited features: paternalism and the habit of 
rule evasion. A consequence of the paternalism is the authoritarian style of operating 
in a democracy - an extreme case of adversarial system of governance that involves 
very high transaction costs. It may be contrasted with the consensus system of 
governance that relies on an open dialogue and on some shared conception of the 
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national interest, which increases the ability of government to make stable 
commitments and softens destructive political competition.  
   At the governance level, habitual deviationism involves inability to make 
commitments, a wide-scale use of public positions for private purposes, and numerous 
violations of the democratic norms of the political contest.  
    Paternalism and habitual deviationism have left their imprint on the cultural 
particularities of the new Russian power elite. Its radicalism, lack of managerial 
skills, inability and reluctance to search for compromise settlements, and its 
corruptibility, entailed a high probability of ineffective governance including serious 
mistakes in choice for the reform design.     
 
12. Consensus governance and interim institutions  
     The main difference between shock therapy and gradualism is not the speed of 
reforms itself but a methodology to transplant market institutions. Gradualism 
suggests that a new system has to be built through a sequence of interim institutions 
that facilitate appropriate modification and adaptation of the new rules and norms. An 
impressive example of an interim institution is Chinese dual-track system (Roland , 
2000). A widely used but a little bit vague concept of “initial conditions” includes not 
only cultural and macroeconomic indicators but also the quality of interim institutions 
that were built at the preparatory stage of the reform. Taking into account initial 
conditions, one has to conclude that reforms, conducted in the successful East 
European countries, were much more gradual than the Russian reforms.  
    First, these countries had more substantial legal, political, and economic traditions 
that retained in social memory since, at the start of the reforms, about 20% of 
population were born in the pre-communist era16. Second, Hungary and Poland had 
much more developed quasi-market institutions. Before 1989 Hungary put in place a 
two-tier banking system, a tax reform, and a corporate law. By 1982 over 50% of 
consumer goods were free of control, the percentage gradually increasing to over 90% 
in 1991.  At the start of the Polish reform in 1990, this country had a well- established 
private sector in agriculture, trade, services, and construction. More than one third of 
                                                          
16 It is also important that the East European societies were much more consolidated by the idea to 
build independent states and to join Western civilization. By contrast, Russia experienced deep 
national crisis because of the USSR disintegration and decreasing role of Russia in the world.  
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the Polish labor force was employed by private firms and produced a quarter of 
national output.  Among communist countries, Czechoslovakia had the most 
developed industrial structure, a small monetary overhang, and extremely low 
external debt-to- GNP  ratio (Bruno, 1993, pp. 211-213).  The differences in the 
strength of the initial price shock, mentioned above, were caused by initial conditions.  
   Thus, the governing elites of East European countries were more skillful in the 
choice of suitable sequences of interim institutions at the pre-reform stage. It does 
concern the reform stage as well, and first of all, the system of losers’ compensation 
including social and industrial policies.        
    Social policy is a standard device to reach a consensus through the compensation of 
losers. In Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, comparatively fast restructuring 
was positively effected by possibilities of early retirement and high pension levels. 
(Commander, McHale, and Yemtsov, 1994). The same measures were used during an 
administration reform in China in 1983. A large section of old-minding bureaucrats 
was forced to retire. However they got high pensions and kept their cabinets and 
access to the government information they had before retirements (Li, 1998)17.     
   The importance of social policy is recognized now by many researchers. It is much 
less understood that industrial policy may also serve as important instrument to reach 
consensus. As Cazes observed, French indicative planning was not only a means to 
coordinate state and private business efforts, but also an opportunity to organize a 
discussion among different groups of population (Cazes, 1990).  
   In a survey of 1999, conducted by World Bank and EBRD, firms from 20 transition 
countries were asked how often the state directly intervenes in firm’s decision on 
sales, prices, wages employment, and investment. (Hellman and Schankerman, 2000). 
Responses comprised always, mostly, frequently, sometimes, seldom, never. A 
composite index of state intervention was calculated as average (by all five types of 
decisions) proportion of firms that gave one of the first four answers (i.e., sometimes 
or more often). Table 10 contains some results of this study. We selected 9 “most 
successful” transition economies, that had largest ratios of GDP in 1999 to GDP in 
1989,  and compared them to Russia. It turns out that only three countries-Estonia, 
Groatia, and Poland- have composite index smaller than Russian one. Estonia is the 
                                                          
17 About role of social expenditure as a prerequisite and a factor of growth see McCallum and  Blais 
(1987) and World Development Report (1997). 
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only country where the state intervenes in the firm’s investment decisions less 
frequently than in Russia. The same study contains data on proportion of firms that 
were subsidized by central or local governments. This proportion is less than in 
Russia only for two countries- Estonia and Poland.  
  The cited study provides evidence that industrial policy was important for the 
success of transition. I believe that its direct economic effect was mixed. However, 
the  direct effect is not an appropriate indicator for this case. Social and industrial 
policies both were necessary to soften the consequences of social and economic 
shocks and to facilitate adaptation to the new conditions for people and economic 
agents. They were necessary to maintain dialogue between the state and citizens.  
 
 
Table 10. Government intervention in the firm decisions: nine most successful 
transition economies and Russia 
 
No       1        2       3 4         5                 6 
 Country Composite 
















1 Estonia 11,8 10,2 10,7 16,0 79,0 
2 Croatia 15,8 18,4 14.4 18,4* 77,8 
3 Poland 16,4 17,3 11,6 20,4 121,8 
4 Russia 21,8 15,9 13,7 15,2 57,8 
5 Czech 
Republic 
23,4 23,7 13,9 27,9 94,8 
6 Slovenia 29,8 23,1 11,5 20,3 105,5 
7 Uzbekistan 34,3 28,7 15,2   - 93,9 
8 Hungary 43,9 37,9 23,3 19,3 99,3 
9 Belarus 52,2 32,6 27,2 18,4 81,4 
10 Slovakia 54,2 52,2 14,4 22,3 100,5 
 
Sources: Hellman and Schankerman, 2000, pр.560, 569;  Economic Survey of 
Europe, 2001, pp. 254, 89.    
* Data of 1998 . 
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This point of view is supported also by macroeconomic data on subsidies and other 
current transfers as percentage of GDP. For all nine countries this percentage was 
larger than in Russia (see Table 10, column 5). 
   The Russian reform story shows that the skill of the governing elite to choose an 
appropriate form and level of state intervention is an important indicator of quality of 
governance and civic culture in general.   
 
 
13. Civic culture and transformational recession 
 
   Trying to explain transformational recession, many authors stress the role of 
institutions. One has to explain, however, why and in what sense were institutions in 
Poland, Estonia, and Uzbekistan better than in Russia.  Comparisons give rise to 
hypothesis that civic culture is important but it is not the only factor that influences 
different indicators of institutional quality used by many authors. There are at least  
two others:  initial distortions and  strategy of the reforms. 
    Many indicators of institutional quality measure, in fact, intensity of criminal and 
semi-lawful redistributive behavior of  economic agents  and the ruling elite (see 
Aron, 2000).  Evidently, the intensity depends on the inclination of citizens to observe 
official norms, on their trust to each other and to political institutions, on their ability 
to adapt positively to the market reforms. All of these are features of civic culture. 
However the culture defines only a potential of the redistributive activity.  The actual 
activity depends on volume, accessibility and attractiveness of rent released due to 
reforms.  
   If initial price distortions are high then price and foreign trade liberalization may 
release a huge volume of  rent. The same is true for privatization if the property is 
highly undervalued. If  government refuses to extract the rent the reforms stimulate 
rent-seeking activity. The scale and the forms of the activity depend on the civil 
culture prevailed. The struggle for the rent may look as organized lobbing in the 
parliament or as bloody battles among criminal groups.   
   In Russia of 1992, domestic prices of oil, fuel and non-ferrous metals were tens and 
hundreds times lower than world prices.  Large enterprises were undervalued 
hundreds and thousands times. Under this conditions there were no any sense to 
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invest into production: all resources should be invested into rent–seeking. Bureaucrats 
redistributed not merely state revenue, but the whole state property. Their power 
strengthened drastically, but their official wage rates fell. That was a field for 
flourishing corruption.    Redistributive coalitions, criminal and semi-criminal ones 
turned out to be the most active part of population. The majority was passive and had 
no civil organizations to resist. Aslund (1996) estimates gross income from rent-
seeking activity in 1992 as 80% of Russian GDP. It is not clear how to estimate lives 
of thousands Russian new businessmen who were killed in the battles for the rent.     
     Thus, we suggest an explanation of transformational recession as a result of 
interaction of three factors: initial distortions, civic culture, and strategy of reforms.       
   There are many evidences that all three factors were comparatively favorable for 
such countries as Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland.  
    Most of former Soviet Republics had strong distortions and weak civil society. 
Among them, Uzbekistan suffered from reforms less than others did, since strong 
political control and gradual reform’s strategy held rent-seeking activity in check.18  
   In Katyshev, Polterovich, 2002, we tried to follow this explanation. We took into 
account three explanatory variables of the output fall: export in non-CMEA countries 
as a percentage of official GDP, shadow GDP as a percentage of total GDP, and speed 
of privatization. The data were available for 16 transition economies (Table 11). For 
each country we define the year of reform’s start (column 3). Export and shadow 
GDP were taken for the pre-reform year from de Melo at al (1997) and Johnson at al 
(1997), and speed of privatization was calculated as increment of a privatization index 
(de Melo at al (1995)) for three years after the reform’s start.  
   Export was considered as a proxy for distortions: the larger export share the less 
distorted has to be the economy.19   
   It is difficult to hold rent seeking in check under fast privatization. Therefore the 
speed of privatization is assumed to have negative influence on output.  
   A percentage of shadow GDP in the total GDP is also an indicator of distortion. The 
same time, it characterizes civic culture prevailed. Large shadow economy means that 
many people do not respect law and do not trust  governing bodies.  
                                                          
18 An interesting comparison of Uzbekistan gradual policy and Kyrgyzstan shock therapy is given in 
Fridman, 2001, pp.83-120. The losses from shock therapy turned out to be higher.  
19 This proxy is not very appropriate for Russia since oil, gas, and minerals amount to the most part of 
its export.   
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1 Azerbaijan 92 5 3  2.9 22.7 0,033 
2 Belarus 92 7 9 5.5 16.6 0,167 
3 Bulgaria 91 8 2 1 0.7 25.1 0,167 
4 Czech 
Republic 
90 9 3 1 4.2 6.0 0.633 
5 Estonia 90 7 4 1.7 12.0 0.167 
6 Georgia 91 3 9  1.9 24.9 0.067 
7 Hungary 90 8 8 1 8.2 27.0 0.367 
8 Kazakhstan 91 7 0  2.2 17.0 0.100 
9 Latvia 90 6 4 1.7 12.0 0.100 
10 Lithuania 90 6 9  3.3 12.0 0.167 
11 Republic of 
Moldova 
92 5 0  2.0 27.1 0.200 
12 Poland 90 9 6 16.5 15.7 0.233 
13 Romania 90 8 2 8.6 22.3 0.233 
14 Russia 92 6 8 1 0.1 23.5 0.400 
15 Slovakia 90 8 7 1 4.2 6.0 0.633 
16 Ukraine 92 5 7 5.4 25.6 0.067 
 
Sources:  Economic Survey of Europe (2001, p. 254), De Melo, Denizer, Gelb, Tenev 
(1997, Table 1),  Jonson, Kaufman, Shleifer (1997, p. 183), De Melo, Denizer, Gelb 




   The output was measured by average GDP for 9 years of reforms as a percentage of  
GDP in the pre-reform year.     
  Table 12 demonstrates that all regression coefficients are significant and have 
predicted signs. Surprisingly, this simple regression explains more than 85% of the 








Dependent Variable: Y 
Included observations: 16 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 81.64 6.48 12.59 0.0000 
EXPORT 2.53 0.44 5.75 0.0001 
BLACK -1.03 0.28 -3.70 0.0035 
WAR -15.65 5.15 -3.04 0.0112 
DPR -32.49 15.47 -2.10 0.0595 
R2 0.896 
Adjusted R2 0.858 
 
 Notation:  
 Dependent variable Y – average GDP as a share of pre-reform GDP.  
 Explanatory variables:  
 Export- Export for the pre-reform year as a percentage of official GDP;   
 Black – shadow GDP for the pre-reform year as a percentage of total GDP;  
 War – dummy variable for countries have been involved into war conflicts; 
 DPR – increment of a privatization index for three initial years of reforms. 
 
  
 14. Conclusions 
   In this paper we try to show that so-called shock therapy might be responsible for 
the failure of the Russian reforms since it did not take into account cultural legacy of 
the Soviet period and strong initial distortions. 
     It was also demonstrated that the most successful reformers followed a concept of 
gradual approach. The difference between two approaches is not a question of rates of 
liberalization, privatization, or deregulation but rather a problem of development of 
appropriate interim institutions.    
    The culture is a much more inertial system than political and economic 
organizations of a society or even knowledge (Almond, 1989). Prices may be 
liberalized in a day, a parliament can be elected in a few months. It is difficult  to 
believe that modern civic culture, a necessary element for success of the market 
economy, can arise in a short time. If the culture is important for success of reforms 
then strengthening enforcement of modern market behavior may be inefficient or even 
impossible. It does not mean that the reforms have to be postponed. However, we 
have to think about a reform strategy as a function of cultural parameters. For every 
set of cultural norms, one has to learn how to design a compatible system of 
organizations and laws that moves the norms towards more advanced ones, so that the 
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whole process approaches modern efficient institutional frameworks. This is an 
important task for future research.    
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